Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
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What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspects of a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.
Chapter 2. Pragmatic Approaches to Belief
Chapter 3. The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Chapter 4. Directives for Knowledge and Belief
Chapter 5. How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence
Chapter 6. Evidence and Its Limits
Chapter 7. The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason
Chapter 8. Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems Are Your Problems!
Chapter 9. Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief
Chapter 10. Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief
Chapter 11. Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
Chapter 12. Reasoning with Reasons
Chapter 13. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief